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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Congress' property power, the Court either failed to take note
of the questions so presented, or, by remaining silent, resolved
them in the petitioners' favor. In upholding the power of Con-
gress to determine the submerged lands issue the Supreme Court
has apparently recognized the essentially political nature of the
question. The Court may, however, still be called upon to inter-
pret the Submerged Lands Act since the extent of control granted
to the states remains to be determined.2 4
Charles M. Lanier
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEGREGATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Plaintiffs, Negro children, sought admission to public schools
restricted by law' to the use of white children in Kansas, South
Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, and the District of Columbia. In all
of the state cases the plaintiffs alleged that the separate facilities
provided for Negroes were unequal and that by being required
to use the unequal facilities they were being deprived of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. In the District of Columbia case the plaintiffs
claimed that requiring them to use any separate facilities denied
them due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
The Federal District Court in Kansas found the facilities to
be equal for both Negro and white children and refused to order
the Negroes' admission to white schools. 2 The Federal District
Court in South Carolina found the facilities to be unequal, and
ordered South Carolina to provide equal facilities but did not
24. Sen. J. Res. 145, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (April 1, 1954), was one attempt
to earmark the revenues from such lands for educational purposes. The
United States Department of Interior has recently decided to lease the
lands beyond the limits stated in the Submerged Lands Act.
1. (a) A Kansas statute permits, but does not require, cities of more
than 15,000 population to maintain separate schools for white and Negro
students. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 72-1724 (1949). (b) The South Carolina Consti-
tution and statutes require segregation in public schools. S.C. CONST. Art.
XI, § 7; S.C. CODE 21-751 (1952). (c) The Virginia Constitution and statutes
require segregation in public schools. VA. CONST. § 140; VA. CODE § 22-221
(1950). (d) The Delaware Constitution and statutes require segregation
in public schools. DEL. CONST. Art. X, § 2; DEL. CODE § 14-141 (1953). (e)
District of Columbia statutes require segregation. 18 STAT., pt. 2, p. 33 (1873).
2. Court relied on the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. Fergu-
son, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896), from which it quoted: "'The object of the [four-
teenth] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the
two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been
intended to abolish distinctions based upon color. Brown v. Board of
Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797, 798 (D. Kan. 1951).
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order the admission of the Negroes to the white schools.8 The
Federal District Court in Virginia found that the facilities were
unequal but that equal facilities were being established and
refused to order that the plaintiffs be admitted to white schools. 4
The Delaware Supreme Court found the facilities to be unequal
and ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to white schools.8
The Delaware Court refused to stay the injunction pending the
creation of equal facilities and questioned the entire "separate
but equal" doctrine. In the District of Columbia, the district
court dismissed the Negroes' complaint.6 The United States
Supreme Court held, "in the field of public education the doctrine
of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facili-
ties are inherently unequal."7 Segregation enforced in the Dis-
trict of Columbia public schools denies Negroes due process of
law.8 Brown v. Board of Educ.; Briggs v. Elliott; Davis v. County
School Board; Gebhart v. Belton, 74 Sup. Ct. 686 (1954); Bolling
v. Sharpe, 74 Sup. Ct. 693 (1954).
In Plessy v. Ferguson, decided in 1896,9 the Court held that
a "statute which implies merely a legal distinction between
white and colored races . . . has no tendency to destroy the
legal equality of the two races," 10 that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was not designed to achieve social equality for the Negro,
and that segregation was permissible if facilities were equal. In
support of its position the Court said, "The most common instance
of this is connected with the establishment of separate schools
for white and colored children, which have been held to be a
valid exercise of the legislative power even by Courts of states
where the political rights of the colored race have been longest
and most earnestly enforced."'"
3. In refusing to grant the injunction the district court said: "The mem-
bers of the judiciary have no more right to read their ideas of sociology into
the Constitution than their ideas of economics." Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp.
529, 537 (E.D.S.C. 1951).
4. Davis v. County School Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952).
5. It should be noted that this is the only one of the present cases in
which the lower court granted the relief sought by the plaintiffs. This relief
was granted on the basis of inequality of separate facilities and not on the
ground that separate facilities were unequal per se. Gebhart v. Belton, 91
A.2d 137 (Del. 1952).
6. The case does not appear to have been reported, but see Boiling v.
Sharpe, 74 Sup. Ct. 693, 694 (1954).
7. Brown v. Board of Educ, 74 Sup. Ct. 686, 692 (1954).
8. Bolling v. Sharpe, 74 Sup. Ct. 693 (1954).
9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
10. Id. at 543.
11. Id. at 544.
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In Berea College v. Kentucky,12 the Court followed the Plessy
rule and held that a state statute which prohibited the teaching
of Negro and white students in the same institution was a valid
exercise of the police power. In Gong Lum v. Rice, 13 it was held
that no rights of a Chinese citizen had been denied by requiring
him to attend a Negro school. Referring to the state's power to
assign him to a Negro school, the Court said, "The decision is
within the discretion of the state in regulating its public schools
and does not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment.' 14
In later cases, however, the Court has prohibited racial dis-
crimination in cases involving interstate commerce, 15 ownership
and occupancy of real estate,' 6 labor union activities,17 voting
privileges, 8 competency of witnesses,19 regulation of businesses
and occupations, 20 and jury selections.21
The later cases in the field of higher education have also
weakened the "separate but equal" doctrine. In Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada,22 decided in 1938, a Negro had been denied
admission to the law school of the University of Missouri because
of his race. There was no separate law school for Negroes in
the state but a state statute authorized the state to pay Negro
applicants' tuition at law schools of adjacent states. The Court
12. 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
13. 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
14. Id. at 87.
15. Segregation is unlawful if it interferes with interstate commerce.
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877). Equality of separate facilities is increas-
ingly harder to prove. See Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941);
Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
16. State statute or local ordinance imposing racial restrictions on the
purchase of real estate is deprivation of property without due process and
a denial of equal protection. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Rich-
mond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
Judicially enforced private covenants constitute state action and are subject
to the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948).
17. A labor union which is the exclusive bargaining agent of a craft or
class of employees is precluded from discriminating against Negroes. Gra-
ham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive F. & E., 338 U.S. 232 (1949); Tunstall v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive F. & E., 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Steele v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
18. Right to vote guaranteed by Fourteenth Amendment in primary
elections, Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); and municipal elections,
Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915). Accord: Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
19. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Blyew v. United
States, 13 Wall. 581 (U.S. 1871).
20. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
21. Exclusion of Negroes from grand and petit juries denied Negro
defendants in criminal cases of equal protection of the laws, Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). Accord: Hill v. State of Texas, 316 U.S.
400 (1942); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939).
22. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
NOTES
held that such a provision was not in compliance with the sep-
arate but equal rule because each state is obligated to give the
protection of equal laws where its laws operate, within its own
borders.
On the authority of the Gaines decision, in 1948 Oklahoma
University was ordered to admit a Negro applicant to its law
school. The Court said that the state must provide a legal edu-
cation for the Negro if it provides a legal education for any other
applicant.2 3 In a subsequent case the Court upheld an Oklahoma
district court order that Oklahoma University admit a Negro or
refuse to admit any applicants until a separate colored law school
had been established 2 4
After the Gaines decision, Missouri had established a law
school for Negroes at Lincoln University. Negroes sought ad-
mission to the state university law school, alleging that the
facilities of the Negro school were not equal to those offered at
the state university law school, but this case never reached the
Supreme Court.2 5 However, twelve years later, in 1950, the same
issue did reach the Court in Sweatt v. Painter.26 The Court
closely scrutinized the facilities of both the Texas University
Law School and the newly established Negro law school. It
considered the reputation and abilities of the faculty, the absence
of a law review, the size of the library, the outstanding alumni,
and "those qualities which are incapable of objective measure-
ment but which make for greatness in a law school," 27 and con-
cluded that the facilities in the colored school were greatly
inferior. In effect, the Court had said that facilities in a law
school could not be separate and yet equal. In McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents28 it was held that the Negro plaintiff
had been denied equal protection because, after being admitted
to the state university's graduate school, he was assigned to a
special desk in the classroom, a special seat in the library, and a
special table in the cafeteria. In this case the equality of the
facilities furnished was not open to question.
These cases reveal the Court's increasing reluctance to follow
the "separate but equal" doctrine. In the present decision the
23. Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631
(1948).
24. Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147 (1948).
25. See Comment, Recent Cases and Trends Involving the Issue of Racial
Discrimination, 19 Mo. L. REV. 57, 65 (1954).
26. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
27. Id. at 634.
28. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
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Court held that "separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal"20 in public schools.
In the instant case the Court has ordered re-argument on
the questions of whether it should formulate specific standards
to govern the transition from segregated to non-segregated school
systems or whether it should formulate only a few guiding prin-
ciples and return the cases to the lower courts to fill in the
details.30 It has invited the attorneys-general of the various states
affected by the decision to file amicus curiae briefs prior to the
issuance of a decree.
Decrees Which Might Be Issued
There are several alternatives from which the Court might
choose in rendering its decree:
(1) It might order immediate admission of the persons who
brought these suits.
(2) It might order their admission within a specified time.
(3) It might order admission within a reasonable time and
allow the lower courts to determine what time is "rea-
sonable."
(4) It might remand the cases for further finding of facts
and thus postpone the issuance of a final decree.
The alternatives will be discussed in the above order.
(1) Decree ordering immediate admission. If such a decree
were rendered it would provide, theoretically at least, the most
rapid enforcement of the decision. The period of delay in obtain-
ing total integration in other areas would be only so long as it
would take the various district courts of other jurisdictions not
directly affected by these cases to grant injunctions in similar
cases. However, as a practical matter, the public reception of
such a decree in the South might cause certain delays. Immediate
relief is usually given where the Court finds a denial of consti-
tutional rights. Immediate cessation of the deprivation of equal
protection has been ordered in cases involving restrictive cove-
nants in real estate contracts, trade unions, primary elections,sl
and graduate schools.3 2 However, the instant cases could be
29. Brown v. Board of Education, 74 Sup. Ct. 686, 692 (1954).
30. For complete text of the questions assigned for re-argument in the
Fall Term, see id. at 692.
31. See notes 16-18, supra.
32. See discussion page 206 supra.
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distinguished because of the many administrative difficulties
which the states must solve in order to eliminate segregation.
The reapportionment of teachers and re-assignment of students,
the availability of physical facilities in a particular locality, and
the standardization of curricula present problems of great com-
plexity.33 Even if public sentiment in all southern states were
in accord with the Court's order, it is doubtful that an immediate
transition could be made without disrupting an efficient public
school system. Because of the Court's recognition of the "com-
plexity" of the problems involved, an "immediate integration"
decree may not be issued if it is shown on re-argument, and in
the amicus curiae briefs, that the Court may "in the exercise of
its equity powers, permit effective gradual adjustment. .. .
(2) Decree ordering admission within a specified time. The
Court might render such a decree in one of two ways: (1) It
might designate a particular deadline for each case and direct
the lower court to administer the decree; or (2) it might set a
final deadline for all five cases and allow the lower courts to
order compliance at an earlier time if the local situation war-
ranted such a decree. Either of these alternatives would afford
the states affected a period of time in which to prepare for the
transition; and either would cause less disruption of the school
system than would a decree ordering immediate integration.
(3) Decree ordering admission within a reasonable time.
A decree such as this would seem to be the most desirable be-
cause there would be varying periods of adjustment depending
on the size of the Negro population, available facilities, and other
factors existing in a particular area. This type of decree would
also relieve the Court of the task of determining what particular
time would be reasonable for the many cases that are certain
to follow. It is submitted that the various lower federal courts
are in a much better position to determine such matters because
of their familiarity with the area involved, and for that reason,
it is submitted that a decree of this type would be the most
practical and workable. However, because there are no pre-
cedents, the Court may be reluctant to delegate such a broad
discretionary power.
(4) Decree remanding the cases to the lower court for a
33. In requesting the "full assistance" of the states, the Court recog-
nized that "the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems
of considerable complexity." Brown v. Board of Educ., 74 Sup. Ct. 686, 692
(1954).
34. Id. at 692, n. 13.
1954]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
further finding of fact. By delaying the decree in this manner
the Court would, in effect, allow the segregated states an exten-
sion of time in which to prepare for whatever decree it might
issue. Thus, by delaying the decree, the Court would not have
to decide whether it has the power to issue a gradual integration
decree. It is possible that a delay such as this would encourage
the states to take steps toward a gradual integration program
rather than have a more rapid program of de-segregation forced
upon them. On the other hand, it is quite possible that the af-
fected states might do nothing at all toward integrating the
school program until ordered to do so. Undoubtedly, if the states
are given such a delay period, there will be efforts to provide
Negroes with equal facilities in the hope that the Negroes will,
for the most part, practice "voluntary segregation" even after the
final decree is issued. It is submitted that this will be workable
in most instances, despite the efforts of "advancement" organiza-
tions to arouse dissatisfaction with a voluntary segregation
program.
Attempts to Continue Segregation
Any decree which the Court might render is likely to cause
some legislative or administrative reaction among the states
which now enforce segregation. It is probable that the more
rapid the transition which the Court imposes, the more extreme
will be the countermeasures adopted by the states in an effort
to circumvent the decree.
Abolition of the public schools. The most publicized of the
proposed countermeasures is the abolition of the public school
system and the creation of segregated private schools. There
have been two general suggestions as to the most effective method
of creating such a system: (1) the establishment of private
schools supported by direct grants from the states; and (2) the
abolition of the compulsory school attendance law and the aboli-
tion of the public schools entirely, and subsidization of education
by grants to the pupil rather than to the school. Under either
plan, supposedly, the state would be completely divorced from
the administration of the schools. During its recent session the
Louisiana legislature considered a proposal similar to the latter
plan.35 The proposed bill provided for the sale or lease of public
school buildings for private school use and for grants to individ-
ual pupils to enable them to attend the private schools. The bill
35. H.B. 1139, 1954 La. Legislature.
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further stated that "after selling or the leasing of said school
property, the School Board shall have no control over the
operation thereof."3 6
Would the maintenance of segregation by either type of
private school system constitute a denial of equal protection of
the law under the present interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment? In the restrictive covenant cases, the Court held
that private covenants excluding the colored race from a certain
area do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, but a state court's
upholding such an agreement is state action and a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Since no court action would be
necessary to enforce segregation in the private schools, Shelley v.
Kraemer would present no obstacle.37
However, in Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library,35 a federal
appellate court held that a private library partially supported
by public funds could not validly exclude Negroes from its
library school. In Lawrence v. Hancock,3 9 a federal district court
held that exclusion of Negroes from a private swimming pool
built by and leased from a city was state action and the action
invalid. Under the reasoning of the Enoch Pratt case, if direct
support is given by a state to a private school, the action of that
school is state action subject to the restrictions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Under the reasoning of the Hancock case, even if a
state makes no financial contribution to a private school, if the
school occupies a building built by and leased from the state,
the action of the school will be considered state action. However,
though the Court denied certiorari in the Enoch Pratt case, these
are the decisions of lower courts and may not be followed by
the Supreme Court.
In the primary election cases, the Court held that the dele-
gation of all powers to conduct primary elections to a private
"club" renders the action of the "club" state action, and the ex-
clusion of Negro voters by such "clubs" is a contravention of the
Fifteenth Amendment. 40 It was held that where the function of a
36. Ibid.
37. "State action ... refers to exertions of state power in all forms.
And when the effect of that action is to deny rights subject to the protec-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is the obligation of this Court to
enforce the constitutional commands." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20
(1948).
38. 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945).
39. 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. W.Va. 1948).
40. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (the conducting by the "Jaybird
Democratic Association" of a preliminary straw vote was state action);
Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
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political party is to select a party nominee in primary elections,
and where a victory in the primary is tantamount to election,
then the action of the political party is state action and the
designation of private groups or clubs to perform these functions
is no less state action. In other words, the Court has held that
the delegation of an important governmental function to a pri-
vate group makes the action of the private group "state action"
subject to the restriction of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court in the present decision said that "education is perhaps the
most important function of state and local governments,"'4 1 and
it might hold that the actions of private individuals or groups
exercising this important function are subject to the limitations
of the Fourteenth Amendment. From the election cases, it seems
that the more a private organization owes its existence to the
state, and the more important the governmental function it per-
forms, the more likely it is that its actions will be considered
state action and thus restricted by the fourteenth Amendment.
A system of private schools might therefore be prohibited from
practicing segregation unless state support and control is very
slight.
If a system is devised in which state control is sufficiently
slight to prevent the action of the private schools from being
labelled state action, will the public tax moneys used to pay
tuition fees to these private schools be serving a "public pur-
pose"? If the state has no control over expenditures by the
schools or the students, the Court might declare that these grants
are serving no "public benefit." 42 There are substantial prece-
dents for upholding such a program against this attack. The
Court has upheld direct payments to parents of children in pri-
vate schools when the funds were earmarked to defray trans-
portation costs; 43 it has also upheld Louisiana's public grants
to private school students for textbooks. 44
Even if a successful plan for the creation of private segre-
gated schools can be devised, however, it is submitted that such
a plan would be the least desirable of all the plans advanced
to maintain segregation because of the difficulties involved in
the maintenance of a high standard of education without a pub-
41. 74 Sup. Ct. 686, 691 (1954).
42. Schuler v. Board of Education, 370 Ill. 107, 18 N.E.2d 174 (1938). See
dissent of Jackson, J., in 5-4 opinion of Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1, 18 (1946).
43. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
44. Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
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licly supervised and coordinated school system. There would
be problems concerning uniform curriculum, adequate plant fa-
cilities, placement of teachers, acceptance of diplomas in insti-
tutions of higher education, and others, all of which would tend
to weaken the whole educational system. The writer suggests
that this system should definitely be a "last resort" measure.
Individual school placement for each student. Another
proposed countermeasure would have local school superinten-
dents assign each individual student to a particular school. Lou-
isiana has recently enacted a statute of this type45 which provides
for individual assignment and an intricate prolonged method of
appeal from any assignment. The dissatisfied parents may re-
quest a hearing which must be held within a reasonable time;
if the assignment is not altered to their satisfaction, the ag-
grieved person may appeal to the parish school board and then
to the district court. The act requires that the applicant pay the
costs of transcribing the record of the hearing held by the parish
school board, and permits a delay of more than ninety days
before an appeal can reach the court.46 If the result sought by
this statute is attained-the necessity of taking each complaint
through the designated chain of command before reaching the
court-then the integration of white and colored students will
be a very slow, prolonged process in Louisiana.
Of course, the Court might look at the intent of the legisla-
ture and invalidate the act as an arbitrary denial of equal pro-
tection. The Court declared a similar type of statute invalid in
Davis v. Schnell.47 Alabama had passed a constitutional amend-
ment which required all prospective voters to demonstrate to
the registrar that they could read and write, and understand
and explain any article of the Federal Constitution. The Court
held that the statute was invalid because it was "broad" and
"vague," even though it contained no discriminatory provisions. 8
If the amendment is used to discriminate the Court will look to
the end and disregard the means. From this it would seem that
the administration, not the text, of this Louisiana act will deter-
mine its constitutionality. It is submitted that this act, if admin-
45. La. Acts 1954, No. 556, LA. R.S. 17:81.1 (Supp. 1954). See page 112
supra.
46. Ibid.
47. 336 U.S. 933 (1949), affirming 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949).
48. "While it is true that there is no mention of race or color in the
Boswell Amendment, this does not save it. The Fifteenth Amendment
nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination."
Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949), aff'd, 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
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istered reasonably, will serve at least as a temporary answer to
Louisiana's problem of how to institute a system providing for
a very gradual integration.
Exercise of the police power. Another countermeasure pro-
posed by Louisiana is a constitutional amendment which does
three things: (1) it authorizes the legislature to pass acts which
establish requirements for admission to public schools; (2) it
authorizes the legislature to submit other constitutional amend-
ments affecting the public education provisions of the Constitu-
tion49 (under the present Constitution, amendments can be sub-
mitted only once in two years);5" (3) it requires that all public
elementary and secondary schools be segregated. The amend-
ment states: "This provision is made in the exercise of the
state police power to promote and protect public health, morals,
better education and the peace and good order in the State, and
not because of race." 51
The validity of the third provision of this proposed amend-
ment will probably be questioned. The Joint Legislative Committee
on Segregation 52 stated that "although a racial classification is still
maintained, this amendment places segregation itself on a differ-
ent basis. It requires segregation as a function of the inherent
right of the state to protect all of its citizens and provide for
their general well being and good order. 1 3 The present decision
outlawed segregation in public schools on the basis of race; will
the Court uphold segregation on any other basis? The Court has
repeatedly upheld state action designed to maintain the public
health, morals, peace, and good order.5 4 However, the result of
the present decisions is to deny the states the power to segregate
students "because of race." This power is, in effect, no longer
reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment as a result
of the present decisions. Since the Court has invalidated public
school segregation under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is not
49. La. Acts 1954, No. 752, proposing amendment of LA. CONET. Art. XII,
§ 1. See page 93 supra.
50. LA. CONST. Art. XXI, § 1.
51. La. Acts 1954, No. 752, proposing amendment of LA. CONST. Art. XII,
§ 1.
52. Committee appointed pursuant to House Concurrent Resolution No.
27, 1954 La. Legislature, Sen. W. M. Rainach, Chairman.
53. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON SEGREGATION, EXPLANATION OF SEGRE-
GATION BILLS PASSED BY LOUISIANA LEGISLATURE, GENERAL SESSION (1954).
54. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (sterilization of insane woman up-
held); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (statute prohibiting polygamy upheld); People v.
Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201 (1903) (statute requiring parents to have sick children
treated upheld despite a conflict with religious beliefs).
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likely that the Court will sustain it as an exercise of the state's
power under the Tenth Amendment.55
Another act of the recent Louisiana legislative session puts
the segregation provision of the above amendment into effect.56
The act makes it a misdemeanor to operate a public school where
both white and colored children are enrolled,57 and it forbids
the state board of education to provide free school supplies to
"mixed" schools. The validity of this act would seem to depend
upon the validity of the amendment itself.
Gerrymandering of school districts. The last countermeasure
is the re-districting or gerrymandering of school districts. In
the gerrymandering cases in the political rights field, the Court
has never ordered a lower court to redraw the boundary lines5s
because of the administrative problem of determining the fair-
ness of the new boundaries. The Court might maintain the same
hands-off policy that was prevalent in the political rights cases
because of the problem of investigating the facts in each case
to determine whether the state action is arbitrary. A re-dis-
tricting plan on a local option basis might be very effective in
large urban areas where Negroes and white persons are fre-
quently already separated into fixed districts; however, the
appearance of "arbitrary districting" would arise in the fringe
areas of the urban centers and throughout the rural areas where
Negroes and whites live in close proximity and are often inter-
spersed. 59 Because of the probable ineffectiveness of this plan
in rural areas, it is submitted that such a measure is ill-suited
for Louisiana.
Possible Implications of the Decisions
What are the implications of these decisions? Will the Court
limit its rejection of the "separate but equal" doctrine to the
public school system? Or is this merely a stepping stone for
55. Cf. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm., 334 U.S. 410 (1948), in which
the Court disregarded the alleged purpose of a statute forbidding the issu-
ance of a commercial fishing license to aliens ineligible for citizenship.
56. La. Acts 1954, No. 555. The legislature also passed another proposed
amendment to the Constitution which allows each school district to vote
additional bonds (present limit is 20% of the assessed value of the property;
amendment raises maximum to 25%) so that more funds can be made avail-
able to equalize the existing separate school facilities. La. Acts 1954, No. 764,
proposing amendment of LA. CONST. Art. XIV, § 14(f). See page 95 supra.
57. Penalty for violation of this act is a fine of not more than $1000
and/or a jail sentence not to exceed six months.
58. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
59. For a complete discussion of this plan and others of similar nature,
see PAUL, A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA (1954).
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similar rulings in other areas of community life? The Negro
plaintiffs in the present cases relied heavily upon the contention
that the maintenance of separate public schools developed in
Negro children an "inferiority complex." Is this a point of
distinction in regard to cases alleging denial of equal protec-
tion to Negro adults? There is strong support for such an
argument; however, it is difficult to say that the Court will
not extend its views to encompass adults. The only certain
conclusion that can be reached is that the "separate but equal"
doctrine is still valid in regard to every type of state action
not involving the public school system; exactly how long the
weakened doctrine will withstand litigation in the future can-
not be determined now.
Huntington Odom
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-INDICTMENT-INTERRUPTION OF
PRESCRIPTION BY PRIOR INDICTMENT
In January 1952 defendant was indicted for manslaughter.
More than a year later, he was indicted again, this time for simple
battery. In the second indictment, the state alleged that the
charge was based on the facts forming the basis of "the indict-
ment heretofore found," reciting the title and docket number of
the prior indictment. Defendant entered a plea of prescription,
which the trial court overruled. The Supreme Court granted
writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari. Held, the indict-
ment for simple battery did not negative prescription and was
fatally defective in its failure to state what offense the prior
indictment had charged or to show what disposition had been
made of the prior indictment. State v. Dooley, 223 La. 980, 67
So.2d 558 (1953).
The pertinent provisions of Article 8 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure allow the state a period of one year after receiving
notice of the commission of a crime to file an indictment. If an
indictment or information is filed within that period, prescription
is interrupted.' Interpreting this provision, the Supreme Court
has held that where the state seeks to negative prescription by
1. Article 8 further provides that if an indictment or information is
filed, and the state fails to act on this indictment or information for three
years in felony cases or two in others, then the district attorney must enter
a nolle prosequi. See page 196 et seq. supra.
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